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1. Introduction 
 
Participation practices are used in many different contexts, and this paper 
relates participation to the context of regional water management and 
specific Dutch water boards. The water board is a government body of 
functional decentralized administration with its own governing bodies and 
financing structure, and is solely concerned with the execution of tasks in the 
field of water management. Among citizens the interest in this form of 
representative democracy and their turn out in water board assembly 
elections is very low. Water board elections are held via the so-called 
`person voting system', but till November 2008 the turn out only amounts to 
an average between 25 and 30 per cent. Some stakeholders (agriculture, 
nature) are strongly involved in this form of regional water management 
because they have particular interest in water management. 
The existing of water boards has been under tension were some political 
parties wanted to abolish the water board’s representative democracy system 
and make them implementing agencies of the province. There were doubts 
about the legitimacy of a functional democratic system that represented 
specific interests, like agriculture more than interest like ecology.  
We can clearly speak about a gap between citizens and the water board 
politics, were not directly affected stakeholders and citizens do not take in 
interest in their work and in their elections. In the past, the function and 
value of water boards for the protection of their inhabitants for floodings 
were very clear. The water boards would have close ties with the inhabitants 
they served. The political water board landscape is changing. At the one 
hand there has been a process of merge, which means that the new and 
bigger water boards cover bigger areas, which means a growing gap between 
the politicians of the water boards and local stakeholders, citizens and 
municipalities. At the other hand changes in the way the water board 
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elections from 2008 onwards, which are now based on list-voting instead of 
interest-pay-say-representation, are organized may awake interest among 
citizens. 
But there is also the issue of the way of policy making. Water boards got 
the reputation of being technocratic, closed organizations. Many of their 
tasks were seen as technical implementation of European, national and 
provincial policies.  But this picture is changing due to the discussions on 
water quantity problems and climate change. Water boards have taken over 
the largest part of urban water management in cities which brings them 
much closer to the interests of many citizens and stakeholders. And finally 
the implementation of the water Framework directive gave new attention to 
water quality problems and the role of water boards. 
 
In this paper we discuss attempts by one water board, Rijn en Ijssel, to 
raise their legitimacy and the support for their policies by addressing the gap 
between politicians and citizens and by improving the use of area-based 
local knowledge and gaining a better insight in the needs and opinions of 
their inhabitants. The water board tries to develop a so-called ‘area-near’ 
approach. An important element is establishing closer ties between the water 
board assembly members and their voters and local partners. 
1. What did the chosen way of working (experimenting with the ‘area- 
near’ approach) contribute to the process and the outcome of the 
cases? 
2. What is the added value of the new way of working for the water 
board government itself?   
3. In how far can such a new form of working contribute to closing the 
gap between citizen and water board? 
 
The theoretical framework to asses this chosen way of working is based 
on literature about the added value of the functional perspective in 
participation. We will first discuss the existing representative democratic 
system in the water boards. Then we will discuss the new way of working in 
water board Rijn en Ijssel and confront this with arguments for functional 
participation. On the basis of criteria taken from the arguments for functional 
participation we will asses the experiments. We will compare the cases with 
similar experiences elsewhere and focus on the ‘representative’ role of 
assembly members. Finally we draw some conclusions what this new 
approach can contribute to closing the gap between citizens and the water 
board. 
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2. Water boards and democracy 
 
Water boards are among the oldest democratic institutions in the 
Netherlands. From the 13th century onwards they were established in the 
lower-lying parts of the country. Nowadays the water boards encompass the 
whole of the country. The Constitution and the Water boards Act (1992) 
established the water boards as decentralized functional government 
authorities. This means they have a dedicated task regarding local and 
regional water management. They are operationally independent to a high 
degree and supervised by the provinces. Their tasks include: 
o Flood protection:  
o Surface water quantity management:  
o Water quality management  
o surface water quality:  
o treatment of urban wastewater 
Since the last century there has been a decline in the numbers of boards 
from numerous small local water boards to much larger, regional boards; 
from 3,500 in 1850 and 2,500 in the late 1940s there are now in total 25 
water boards. A water board has two governing body, a (general) assembly 
(about 30 seats) and a executive assembly (about 5 seats), which is elected 
from the general assembly, and a chairman. The chairman is not elected, but 
appointed by the Crown. 
The assembly is elected by the inhabitants of the water board in a 
specific system of elections. Till November 2008 this system was based on 
the representation of various categories of stakeholders in the governing 
bodies of water boards. Representatives of the various categories are elected 
to their positions on the assembly. Elections to the water board assemblies 
differ on a number of points from the elections held for Parliament or town 
councils, for example. This is because of the relation between elections and 
the specified tasks of water boards and the adage of `interest-pay-say' 
resulting from it. The major difference between water board elections and, 
for example, town council elections lies in the meaning of the elections. 
With the election of a town council a fixed number of seats are divided 
among the various political parties, on the basis of the number of votes for 
the candidates. Town council elections are held by means of the so-called 
`list voting system'. 
The water boards representative democracy system was based on the 
‘interest-pay-say' triplet. Those who benefit from the activities of the water 
board have to pay a tax for its services, but receive a proportionate say in the 
assembly in return. Stakeholders pay for the execution of certain activities 
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and the associated infrastructure. Those who have an interest in the activities 
bear the costs and have influence on the running of the water board, via 
elected representatives. Proportionate to his interest, a stakeholder pays a 
water board tax. For many years farmers were the only recognized 
stakeholders. Later residential and business property owners were also 
recognized as having an interest in water management and from the 1950s 
households and industries were introduced as stakeholders. Various interests 
have to be secured in the water board assembly. There are five categories of 
stakeholders according to the Water Boards Act. All categories have a fixed 
number of seats in the assembly, which corresponds with the balance of 
interests (and tax payments) concerned in the activities of the water board.  
The stakeholders categories are: 
* households (including residents) 
* landowners 
* tenants (optional) 
* owners of buildings 
* industry. 
In the regulations for each water board the number of seats by which the 
various categories are represented in the water board assembly are laid down 
by the provinces. Here the nature and size of the interest of a particular 
category in the execution of the tasks of the water board are taken into 
account, as well as the contribution to the costs to be paid by this category. If 
a water board is located in a densely populated urban area with a lot of 
industrial activity, the residents and business buildings categories have a 
larger share in the water board assembly than in a water board in a thinly 
populated area with a lot of agricultural activity. The average water board 
assembly consists of 30 members.  
In addition to the limitative listing of stakeholder categories, the Water 
Boards Act stipulates that, under the regulations, the provincial council can 
assign to certain stakeholders the authority to nominate one or more 
representatives of their categories onto the water board assembly, without 
the need for byelections; these places are referred to as `quality seats'. 
A number of provinces have made use of this possibility, albeit sporadically. 
The category `industry' is elected indirectly by Chambers of Commerce and 
Industry. 
From the new elections in 2008 onwards the water board assembly elections 
is based on list voting; which means that the ‘one person-one vote’ system is 
based on voting for lists of candidates from political parties and registered 
interest groups.  
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3. The cases; experimenting with an ‘area-near’ approach 
 
 
The water board Rijn en Ijssel is the last water board that still has so-
called sub regional assemblies (afdelingsbesturen). With the upcoming water 
board elections and the new Dutch law on water boards these sub regional 
councils will disappear, and the lines to local stakeholders will be much 
longer. Therefore the water board is searching for new approaches to ‘close 
the gap’ with actors in their area. 
The water board Rijn en Ijssel defines the ‘area near approach’ 
(gebiedsnabij werken) as creating administrative and societal support for 
their policies and receiving societal input for projects and area policy. The 
water board is testing this new approach in three so-called ‘administrative 
experiments’ (bestuursexperimenten). 
• Waterplan Zutphen: This experiment is a municipal water planning 
process were (regional) water board council members, municipal council 
members and stakeholders, including citizens, work together.  
• Water quality track Rheden: This is experiment were water board, 
municipality and stakeholders , including citizens cooperate in activities 
to improve surface water quality. 
• Vision Baakse Beek-Veengoot: This experiment concerns a development 
of a vision for the Baakse Beek-Veengoot rive basin area, aiming at 
creating support for the vision in the area. 
 
 
4. The concept of ‘area-near’ working 
 
‘Area-near’ working is defined by the water board Rijn and Ijssel as the 
on the spot creating of a societal and receive administrative support and 
receiving societal input for a certain project or area. Condition for area based 
work is that all relevant parties are involved in the process. 
The ideas for near work resulted from the evaluation of the governing 
board structure of the water board Rijn and IJssel (Berenschot, 2005). The 
water board created after the merge of three original water boards, a 
structure with a general assembly and three regional district assemblies. The 
district assemblies had mainly an advising task. Members of the regional 
districts assemblies that were not also in the general assembly were named 
substitute assemblies members.  
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From a survey under these substitutes and general assembly members 
(Berenschot, 2005) as strong points of the district management structure 
came forward: 
o the involvement of the area in the water board governing; 
o the way in which regional knowledge is taken into account in the 
policymaking; 
o the small distance between citizen and water board the narrow link 
between policy and implementation; 
o area bound water management and the use of regional expertise 
Further the survey concluded that the members of the general assembly 
had only few external contacts with stakeholders, citizens and municipalities. 
The external contacts of the water board were mainly dealt with by the 
executive board and for the rest left to the individual initiatives of the 
individual council members.  External contacts of the general assembly 
would contribute to the ties with the region and the visibility of the council 
in the region. This was important for the water board because image research 
in 2005 showed that civil society organizations and farmers are well 
informed concerning the tasks and activities of the water board, but business 
and citizens much less. 
A generally recognized point to improve was the visibility and the 
position of the general assembly. Berenschot concluded that this visibility 
and positioning asks not so much for adaptation in the structure as well as 
for adaptations in culture. Concrete suggestions were area consultations, area 
visits, publicity campaign, etc. Berenschot also expected a positive influence 
of the new water board elections and the new general assembly composition. 
They suggested investing in internal and external visibility of the general 
assembly and daily governing board. And to invest in ties with the area, 
which best could be done by close ties to the area in the organization by 
means of informal information transfer. Several ideas were formulated to 
create this informal information transfer, like setting up ad-hoc commissions 
for projects or specific area commissions.  
The idea for the area based policy is also influenced by the problem of 
democratic legitimacy of water boards and by the fundamental discussions 
about the existence of water boards. Solutions were found in strengthening 
representative democracy by reforming the election system. Representative 
democracy can also be strengthening by another, more open style of 
working. Strengthening representative democracy is complemented by 
strengthening participatory democracy. ‘Area-near’ working is a form of 
instrumental use participation. Participation is a means to raise legitimacy, 
support and the quality of decision making.  
We use the umbrella term ‘public participation’ here to encompass 
citizen, stakeholder, and community participation. ‘Public participation’ 
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covers a broad range of interactions between government and civil society to 
design, implement, and evaluate policies (compare Renn, Webler and 
Wiedemann, 1995). This is narrower than political participation, since the 
latter includes all activities by citizens and stakeholders that influence 
government decision-making such as voting and lobbying.  
Participants, as perceived in this paper, can be both individual and 
collective actors. Individuals can be affected and/or involved laypeople, or 
citizens that are spokespeople or advocates of affected unorganised interests 
such as neighbourhoods. Stakeholders we can define as: “socially organised 
groups that are or perceive themselves as being affected by a decision” 
(Renn et al., 1993: 190). Stakeholders defined in this way encompass 
communities that can range from geographically defined ones to population 
and risk groups. 
Stakeholders can be collective actors such as neighbourhood initiatives, 
social movements, or local network enterprises that are composite actors 
whose purposes “are dependent on and guided by the preferences of their 
members” (Scharpf, 1997: 54). Or they can be corporate actors such as 
unions, chambers of commerce, employer organisations, who are composite 
actors with a high degree of autonomy in defining their purposes from the 
participating actors. Collective actors are often represented by individuals 
linked to the collective actor. 
 
 
5. The instrumental functions of public participation 
 
The instrumental perspective stresses the functional role of participation 
as an instrumental tool. A difficulty with the instrumental function of 
participation is that it can be functional for quite different reasons for 
politicians, for administrators, for stakeholders, for citizens, and for experts.  
An important instrumental function of public participation that would 
increase the legitimacy of the water board is the function of improving 
decisions or ‘quality of decision making’ (Coenen, Huitema and O’Toole, 
1998). There are differences in how to view ‘better decisions’. The criteria 
for what we see as a ‘good’ decision depends on underlying assumptions 
about what is a good decision in relation to participation. Broadly speaking, 
one can place the emphasis on participation as a means to create decisions 
that are fair, or stress that participation should lead to more competent 
decisions (Webler, 1995).  
Fairness is connected to the idea of equity: does everyone have a fair say 
in the decision-making process, is equal access guaranteed, and are the 
outcomes distributed equitably? Competence relates to the use of 
information that is available at the time the decision is made.  
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Here, we operationalise a competent decision as one that does not ignore 
relevant information that is in the possession of certain groups. Coenen, 
Huitema, and O’Toole (1998) emphasise the link between the participatory 
content of certain decision-making processes and the rationality of their 
outcomes by stressing competent decisions. In this way, they connected the 
operationalisation of competent decisions to the prominent debate about 
rational decision-making among academics such as Etzioni (1967), Dror 
(1964), Lindblom (1959), and Simon (1957). They accepted Faludi’s (1986, 
1987) interpretation of rational decision-making as a rule for testing 
decisions, rather than as a prescription for how to act in reality. Faludi has 
argued that rationality is not an objective criterion of quality but a subjective 
one relative to the definition of the decision situation. A decision is rational 
if it is the best of all the possible alternatives, taking into account all their 
consequences weighed in the light of a set of values that includes, where 
relevant, equity. All alternative actions and their consequences have to be 
assessed within the definition of the decision situation. This decision 
situation can be compared with a verdict in court. In justifying a decision the 
question is: was it reasonable for the planner/defendant to know what they 
were doing, to be expected to find out, and so forth. Decision-making 
improves in quality as additional relevant information is considered, in 
particular information distributed across many groups (Coenen, Huitema, 
and O’Toole, 1998). A decision should not ignore relevant information that 
is held by certain groups. 
The idea is that to achieve better decisions, through the instrumental 
function of public participation, this requires involving people in the 
identification of needs, in the analysis of problems, in planning, and in 
taking action. In essence, decisions become more creative through using 
ideas and knowledge from the public, or more responsive and more 
appropriate to the needs and wishes of the public.  
From the instrumental perspective, there are two lines of reasoning for 
the instrumental involvement of the public in environmental decision-
making. In the first place, finding and implementing sound solutions to 
environmental problems may necessarily require continuing and broadened 
participation far beyond the ‘usual’ experts and political elites. This demands 
knowledge be added by the public to the decision process, including 
contributing to analyses and the assessment of alternatives. Secondly, 
environmental decision-making often requires a shift of resources and 
opportunities from some groups to others, thus raising inherently political 
questions. Consequently, a decision is seen as better if it builds on increased 
public support and the decision leaves less potential for conflict. Neglecting 
information from the public leads to legitimacy questions and potential 
conflicts.  
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If one sees a decision as better if all the alternative actions and their 
consequences have been assessed within the definition of the decision 
situation, in other words that the decision does not ignore relevant 
information in the possession of certain groups, then public participation can 
be instrumental in all phases of the decision-making process. In terms of 
decision-making from an instrumental perspective, public participation will 
improve: 
o the information available for the decisions (such as a broader range of 
alternatives, or a view from the public on the consequences); 
o the assessment of the alternatives (additional monitoring, appraisal, and 
judgement by the participants); 
o the potential for action and implementation (through support-building 
and conflict reduction). 
 
In instrumental terms, participatory decision-making processes 
potentially have some considerable advantages over other decision-making 
processes. The instrumental arguments for public participation stress 
efficiency and effectiveness criteria. Public participation may provide, at 
least, a partial cure for problems in non-participatory processes. Examples of 
such problems are that policymakers inadequately consider public values and 
preferences, innovative solutions go unexplored, and policy implementation 
is confronted with public mistrust or even a culture of conflict (Beierle, 
1998).  
There is a perceived downside to enhancing the analysis, judgement, and 
potential for action and implementation in terms of the cost-effectiveness of 
the decision-making process. From a government perspective, complaints 
against participatory decision-making are often that it leads to time delays, 
that there is a bias towards certain vested interests and therefore information 
is incomplete or distorted, and that there is the problem that the public does 
not have sufficient knowledge to participate usefully in decision-making. 
Participation as a panacea for governmental problems is opposed by some 
citizens. From the public’s perspective there are normative objections, such 
as the non-representative input to decision-making, but also very 
instrumental objections, such as the costs of participating and the difficulty 
in protecting one’s own interests. 
The promise that public participation apparently holds for the quality of 
decision-making has to be weighed against the limitations of public 
participation in terms of the quality of decision-making and the interests of 
citizens.  
Despite these limitations in relation to the typical efficiency arguments 
formulated above and we cab argue that: 
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o Public participation raises the substantive quality of the decision itself: 
by adding knowledge to the decision-making process in a way that 
incorporates relevant knowledge (such as good ideas and lay expertise 
by participants). 
o Public participation can add to the quality of the analysis: by engaging 
participants in the assessment and monitoring of alternatives. 
o Public participation will broaden public support for environment-related 
decisions and this will lead to a time gain (shorter decision-making 
processes in the longer term) and co-implementation. 
o Reducing the level of conflict will facilitate action and implementation. 
In the table below the different arguments and motives for public 
participation are summarised.  
 
Table 1 Arguments and motives for public participation 
(Coenen, 2009, see also Coenen, Woltjer, and Van de Peppel, 2001) 
 
Normative arguments Instrumental arguments 
For 
government 
For participants For government 
authority 
For 
particip
ants 
Functioning of 
democracy 
Emancipation, 
particularly of 
certain groups 
Additional source of 
ideas and information 
Protecti
on of 
stakehol
ders’ 
interests 
 
Creating 
‘shared 
responsibility’ 
in, and 
legitimacy of, 
water-related 
decisions  
Empowerment 
and learning 
about the water 
problems 
facing society  
Monitoring and 
appraisal by 
participants 
Broadening of public 
support for water- 
related decisions 
Reducing the level of 
conflict 
 
 
6. Ex-post analysis of the cases 
 
With cases we mean here the (municipal) processes within which water 
board experiment with area-near ‘way of working’ has been carried out. Two 
cases, the water plan in the municipality Zutphen and the Water quality track 
in the municipality of Rheden were evaluated ex-post, this means after the 
full experiment ended. 
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The first question of this paper is: what did the chosen way of working 
(experimenting with the area-near approach) contribute to the process and 
the outcome of the cases? 
This first question was difficult to separate in the research from the 
second question about the added value of the water board experiments for 
the water board itself. It is not simple to separate the value of the way of 
working from the value for process and the outcome of the case. Where the 
experiment is positive for the process and the outcome of the case it has also 
a positive value for the water board’s way of working. 
Nevertheless we can draw a number of conclusions concerning the 
relation between the experimenting and the used cases:  
- Experimenting has had a stimulating function for both the start and 
course of the plan process in Zutphen.  Because it was an experiment the 
plan process started quicker and got more priority 
- The water quality track in Rheden was the first time a municipality 
worked on such a track and the case was also the first time the new 
scenario method was used. This stapling of pilots in the water quality 
track Rheden and additional uncertainties and activities led to the feeling 
among internal and external project leaders of the case that the 
experiment was extra ballast in the case process. On the other hand 
governing board experimenting led to larger attention to the water 
quality track and contributed in that sense positive to the case outcome 
and process. 
- The experiments have contributed to a more intensive cooperation 
between the municipal alderman board and the executive board of the 
water boards and led to direct contacts between involved AB-leden and 
stakeholders, citizens and municipal council members. The exact 
contribution of this intensified cooperation to the process and outcome 
of each case is difficult to prove. 
- In processes like the drawing up of water quality tracks and municipal 
water plans there will generally be of some input of stakeholders and 
citizens. The experiments have led to an intensification of this input. The 
exact contribution in terms of nature and scope of this to participation 
compared with a situation were the case would not have been an 
experiment with less involvement of the water board, is unclear. 
- It is unclear in how far the fact that the case were experiments has had a 
positive influence on participates of citizens. For some citizens who 
have regular contact with the water board possibly, however many 
participants have difficulties in seeing the distinction between the 
government layer municipality and the government layer water board. 
For them there is just one government. 
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- It is not yet clear is the fact that the cases are an experiment, has led to 
more substantive priority, for example to the more earlier adoption of 
measures or larger measures. 
- Council members mentioned in the interviews that the experiments led 
to more emphasize of water topics municipal on the municipal political 
agenda, with the result that water problems and solutions that were taken 
for granted now explicitly appear on the municipal political agenda. 
- Organizing new forms of deliberation besides existing traditional 
meetings led to pulling out the municipality council members and AB-
leden. 
 
 
7. The added value for water board itself 
  
The second question is: what is the added value of the new way of 
working for the water board government itself?  In the research we 
formulated on the basis of insights from participation literature, evaluation 
criteria for the added value of the ‘area near approach’. Thereby the 
objectives of the ‘area-near’ approach have been compared with general 
functions of participation 
The main classification of arguments for participation is in the so-called 
normative and functional arguments for participation. The added value of the 
near area approach is related here both to the participation of stakeholders 
and citizens and on participation of the partners in the experiments 
The normative arguments for participation concern the argumentation 
that participation is important because `stakeholders (including 
municipalities) should have the possibility to take part because in the 
decision-making, because this would lead to:  
- a better functioning (functional) democracy; 
- a greater legitimacy of the decision-making process; 
- more awareness of water problems. 
In both experiments the ‘area-near’ approach has contributed to a better 
functioning functional democracy because the involved assembly and 
executive board members have heard the voice of stakeholders and citizens 
directly. This contributed for assembly-members, to their own saying, to a 
better understanding how citizens and stakeholders think about issues 
concerning water problems and solutions. Moreover there was an intensified 
contact with municipal council members. This led to more understanding for 
the functioning of each other's type of administration. Besides reinforcing 
(informal) contacts of assembly-members, there was a more intensive 
contact between executive board members and municipal aldermen then 
usual would be the case in such projects. 
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It is unclear to what the water board experiments have contributed that 
citizens and stakeholders see the processes are as more legitimate. On the 
one hand we can talk of an increase of the legitimacy, because according to 
their own opinion stakeholders and citizens appreciated it to be able to 
discuss municipal water policy. On the other hand the average citizens have 
difficulties in seeing the difference between water board and municipality. 
Moreover the visibility was and recognisability of the water board in the two 
processes was rather limited. 
Both experiments have by generating extra activities and contacts in the 
case processes, and led to more awareness among citizens, stakeholders and 
municipal council members of the role water problems play in the 
municipalities Though the chosen area-near way of working this awareness 
was stronger forward than in cases that were not experiments. For the 
municipal council members the experiments put water more clearly on the 
municipal political agenda. 
Functional arguments concern the argumentation for participation as a 
means for both government and stakeholders (also municipalities) to fulfill 
their needs, because the experiments should lead to:  
- new ideas for the policy;  
- strengthening public and societal support for the policies;  
- the prevention of implementation problems;  
- the possibility to articulate stakeholder interests and the possibility to 
protect these interests by the stakeholders. 
 
Were the experiments a source of new ideas for the policies? In both 
experiments the workshops produced traceable input. In the water plan 
Zutphen it can be clearly indicated what has happened with the input from 
the process. In the water quality track in Rheden the input of the citizen and 
stakeholders have been used to verify the own ideas of the project team on 
future municipal scenarios. This scenario development concerned a technical 
process where one converted goals and aims with particular parts of the 
municipal water into scenarios with associated measures. 
Several respondents indicated that in their opinion the support for water 
policy had increased. Many parties have sat down at the table to discuss 
water problems, such as neighborhood associations and housing, which 
probably without the area approach would not have reflected on these issues. 
It is still unclear to what extent the experiments have contributed to the 
prevention of implementation problems, because the water quality track 
measures and the water plan have been not yet implemented. The nature of 
the water plan and the technical character of the water quality track measures 
do not seem give much reason to expect big objections or resistance of the 
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population against the measures. Working with the future scenarios 
contributes to the understanding of the need of measures. 
Before we can judge if stakeholder and citizens interests are articulated 
and protected though the area-near approach, we first have to verify that the 
conditions has been satisfied that these interests are represented and that all 
relevant parties have been involved in the process. In the workshops the 
traditional interests have been represented but also ordinary citizens. For 
example in their role as neighbors of a pond, or as a member of a 
neighborhood association. There were no big political disputes in both cases, 
and a large consensus concerning the future scenarios. However, it appears 
difficult to keep the ordinary citizens a board during the process. 
 
8. Ex-ante evaluation of the case Baakse beek Veengoot 
 
The conclusions above were all based on the two ex-post evaluated 
experiments in the urban areas. The third experiment, which concerns 
consensus building over a vision for a river basin area, was quit different. 
This experiment can at this moment only for a large part only be evaluated 
ex-ante, because the process will run many years. 
In the two urban processes the municipality had the initiative in the 
process. Particular in the water plan case the municipality was more an 
owner of the process then the water board. This had everything to do with 
harmonization and integration of water policy and other municipal policies. 
In the area process Baakse Beek-Veengoot the water board is, in mutual 
consultation with the province, been designated as the leading actor. 
The area process Baakse Beek-Veengoot stretches over a much longer 
period than two urban experiments. There is at the case Baakse Beek-
Veengoot not only a policy-making process for the river basin but especially 
a process of creating consensus in the development of a river basin vision. A 
partial vision has already been developed with some (formal) participation, 
but this is not a fully integrated vision. Particular agriculture is missing in 
this vision. This current vision therefore still has the status of a starting 
document. The river basin vision will have to be developed within outlines, 
determined by the general assembly. These outlines concern hard goals 
concerning the water board’s water management tasks and more soft wishes 
for the area. 
The case Baakse Beek-Veengoot concerns large investments in contrast 
to the two other urban cases. And in contrast to the two other experiments 
this process will have direct consequences for inhabitants concerned, such as 
the (forced) sale of agricultural farms. 
In the two other experiments the new way of working was more about 
obtaining area-specific knowledge and getting insight in the opinions of 
 15 
 
citizens and stakeholders. In the area process Baakse Beek-Veengoot it is 
more about building consensus between several interests in the area 
Characteristic of the content of this project is that outlines of what goals 
the water boards wants to reach in the area with respect to their water task 
are laid down in the form of hard and soft goals. But these water goals must 
be balanced with other interests in the area, such as agriculture. Because the 
water board has the leading role in the integrated process, the water board 
also has committed itself to realize a number of other tasks for the area 
particularly in the field of nature and agriculture such as the realization of 
new nature. 
Characteristic of the process is that this process lays large responsibility 
at a number of stakeholders (farmers, estate owner) in the area, and 
intermediate organizations or representatives of these stakeholders, to 
formulate and introduce their own interests in the development of the vision. 
This makes them co-producers and co-implementers of the vision. 
The process organization exists of a steering group, a project group and 
an implementing task force. In the project group a representative of the 
farmer’s organization LTO has been incorporated. The implementing task 
force is very widely been set up, with involvement of civil servants from 
water board and province but also from other organizations from the area. In 
this way area-near working shapes already the process organization. In two 
previous discussed experiments this only applied to the municipalities. Also 
there the intention to make maximum use of the existing structures in the 
area. 
A main point in the development of the vision is the input in the 
agriculture paragraph in the vision. There has been chosen for a model where 
the actual situation of agriculture and the desired future situation of the 
agriculture in the area, are developed in close cooperation with agriculture 
representatives (LTO). Together with the water board the agricultural 
stakeholders analyze and examine how the developments in agriculture can 
be coordinated with the water task and other interests in the area. By taking 
along the agriculture stakeholders in this analysis, the basis for the vision 
will increase, the more so if the fact can be confirmed that there are win-win 
situations in the area. The members of LTO are not homogeneous. The one 
farmer will be glad to end his farm, the other with pain in its heart. This 
analysis also must happen for and with the other interests (recreation, nature, 
the social agenda, etc.) 
The implementation needs input in the form of local knowledge and 
opinions of all stakeholders in the area. Therefore not only input is needed 
from stakeholders and partners such as municipalities, LTO, land-managing 
organizations, but also input from intermediate organizations (for example. 
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rural Councils, agrarian nature associations, foundation church roads, et 
cetera) and inhabitants of the area. 
Area near working means that contacts between assembly members and 
stakeholders, partners and citizens in the area are intensified, so assembly 
members and executive board members can take as much as possible directly 
local knowledge into account as well as opinions of all involved in the area. 
This can not only be accomplished with traditional (formal) participation. 
Formal traditional participation means that the participants react to prepared 
plans of water board and province. Participation must be much more 
interactively must. The new way of working with the agriculture 
stakeholders is a good example. New forms of working can be for example 
forming panels of inhabitants from the area. 
 
9. Comparing with other participation experiences 
 
The water boards had already experience with participation. The water 
plan of the municipality Arnhem of 2003 municipality was financed (nearly) 
entirely by the municipality, but was realized in close cooperation with the 
water board. Remarkably for this municipal water plan process was that the 
meetings that had been set up in the beginning got large attention. The first 
meeting for to inventory of main points in the Gelredome stadium drew 300 
participants. This was continued with an information evening with 150 
people present. 
In follow up meetings the number of participants not only declined, but 
became also became less and less representative for the Arnhem population 
(65-plus). The longer the process took, more and more externals (companies, 
nature/environment organizations) pulled out. From participation literature 
this pulls out of certain groups during the process is a well know 
phenomenon. A lesson which is drawn for this reason from the plan process 
in Arnhem for the set-up of the process in Zutphen, is that a planning process 
should not be too long. Another lesson has been the importance to give in 
advance the necessary good information to externals and create realistic 
expectations. 
More interesting than comparing with traditional participation processes 
is comparing with other municipal experiment of the changing institutional 
context of local democracy and one of the means to bridge the gap between 
politicians and citizens. The low turn-out of the Dutch local elections in the 
seventies and eighties caused serious doubts about local democracy being in 
a crisis. They key motives for the so called political renewal (‘bestuurlijke 
vernieuwing’) were the low local election turn-out in combination with the 
disinterest of the voters with municipal polices. This disinterest was shown 
from voting behaviour, dominated by national issues and national parties’ 
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voters’ preference and satisfaction with local government together with a 
lack of interest to get involved in local politics (Coenen, 1998). 
In particular the low turn-out at the 1990 local elections (at 62 per cent) 
lead to many activities in the field of ‘political renewal’. Almost 96 per cent 
of Dutch municipalities took up initiatives under this flag of political and 
administrative renewal (Gilsing, 1995). A general diagnosis of the problem 
was that the 'policy style' of municipalities was too formal and too closed, 
with public administration directed inwards onto the organisation itself. The 
policy style was seen as no longer being in line with more general changes in 
the relationship between municipalities and their citizens. Instruments were 
introduced to find out what citizens think, mean and want, such as a 
referendum or some form of opinion research. The solution was sought in 
new ways of policy-making which (presumably) are better accommodated to 
the demands of citizens. In general this meant that local administrators and 
politicians aimed to change modes of interaction with the citizenry. Social 
scientists refer to these modes as 'interactive policy-making', 'coproduction 
of policy', or strategic 'bottom-up' policy-making.  Through a more 
communicative approach of policy-making citizens are brought in at the 
outset of the policy-making process instead of involving them after draft 
plans have been completed 
There is a great resemblance between these type of solutions and the 
area-near approach but also some important differences. In the first place the 
crisis in municipal local democracy was not about the existence of 
municipalities. In contrary, research showed that Dutch citizens were quit 
satisfied with the services municipalities offered and considered the local 
authorities as reasonable useful, legitimate and important. But they didn’t 
consider the municipal politics as an important political arena were citizens 
should get involved (Tops, 1991). Secondly, citizens do have an opinion on 
many problems on the local level although many of these issues are taken up 
by national political parties. In municipal elections these nationalized issues 
dominate the local elections.   In water board elections it is much less clear 
for citizens why and about what they vote. 
The main resemblances are of course the feeling of the politicians that 
they lost contacts with their inhabitants and the criticism on the way of 
closed policy making. The main new element in the area-near approach is 
the role of general assembly members. 
 
 
10. The role of general assembly members  
 
Water boards have already close ties with their area in the sense that they 
do use of local knowledge in the policymaking. There are already regular 
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contacts between municipality and water board civil servants and regular 
contact between alderman of municipalities and water board. The most 
important new element in the experiments is the involvement of the 
assembly members which directly touches upon the underlying ideas of area-
near working: make the water board visible and recognizable and develop 
closer ties informal contacts with stakeholders, citizens and municipalities in 
the area of the water board. 
We can image several roles for assembly members in ‘area-near’ processes, 
with an incurring involvement of assembly members. 
1. Participatory observation 
2. Actively presenting 
3. Joining the discussion  
4. Integrated contribution in the discussion. 
Ad 1. In this role an assembly member plays an active listening role. The 
role exists especially of listening and observing. There is difference with 
`solely witnessing on distance’, in the sense that the other participants are 
aware that an information transfer takes place. The assembly member is not 
actively searching an informative or discussing role, but can on request give 
information.  
Ad 2. In this role the assembly member not only has an active listening 
role, but also actively gives information on for example the aim of 
experiment or the water board policies.  
Ad 3. In this role an assembly-member mix himself in discussions, give 
their opinion and share arguments.  
Ad 4. In this role the assembly-member tries to contribute actively to the 
objectives of the water board, by for example lobbying with partners. 
 
A lesson from the experiments is that in a minimal and unclear role 
assembly-member pull out. But a larger role brings some specific problems, 
particular capacity problems both in terms of time consumption and in terms 
of necessary knowledge to play a role. Assembly-members themselves 
indicated that they need to have some form of administrative support. The 
necessary knowledge follows from the role which one is considered play in 
the process. On the other hand the role to play can follow the knowledge an 
assembly-member has. There is also the problem of responsibilities of 
assembly members versus the executive board. 
The culture within water board till now is that especially the executive 
board ensures the external contacts. Contacts of assembly members with 
externals have been based informally and ad-hoc based on the coincidental 
geographical and social context of assembly members. Playing an external 
role as a representative of the water board or if (functional) ‘representative’ 
is for many current assembly-members a new and unusual situation. 
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Where one sees in the experiments that municipal council members play the 
role of ‘representative’ (like a member of parliament) automatically. 
Municipal council members are socialized in their parties and through 
courses to play their role as ‘representative’. Contacts with the municipal 
population are intensive. In the municipalities in the area of Rijn and IJssel 
the municipal council members know the population of their municipality 
and have a large network. Municipal council members spend much time on 
their council work and have frequent contacts with their executive board of 
aldermen. Assembly-members of the water board on the other hand have a 
much lower meeting frequency and less frequent contacts with their 
executive board. 
 
11. An analysis and some conclusions 
 
This brings us to the last question: In how far can such a new form of 
working contribute to closing the gap between citizen and water board? 
We have to consider that the added value of this new approach can only 
be assessed on a case by case basis. The success and failure of the 
experiments can be explained by the implementation of the chosen ‘area-
near’ approach or by the ideas underlying itself. Simplistic put it can be that 
area near has work no been implemented well, or that the approach would 
not work in any situation. 
The underlying ideas of area-near working, to make the water board 
visible and recognizable and develop closer ties informal contacts with 
stakeholders, citizens and municipalities in the area of the water board, will 
be important for all water boards.  
The experiments did not change so much in the quality and outcome of 
the process. But there was a clear cultural change. It made municipal council 
members and citizens clear that water boards are there, and that they have 
important tasks. 
Given the nature of their tasks many water board policies will be 
relatively closed, technocratic implementation. The central government 
provides a national legal framework and a strategic policy and the water 
board has the authority to employ executive coercion. But the water board 
does have has legislative power in the formulations of by-laws and can make 
decisions with respect to budget, annual accounts, taxes, control, water level, 
licensing and water management plans. Due to climate change water 
management starts playing a much larger role in spatial planning and has to 
compete with other interest for room in both urban areas and rural areas. 
This brings the water board tasks closer to the stakeholders and citizens. 
Water boards start taken new roles as process managers in river basin areas, 
balancing interests that go beyond their traditional tasks. 
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Crucial for this new way of working is the role of the water board’s 
representative democracy. Water boards are very professional 
organizations. In the last years they all focused very much on a new 
business like way of working. Their self control function was based on 
business cycles and clear planning and performance measuring. 
Inhabitants were defined as customers and not as voters. The 
performance of the water boards were measured in terms of customer’s 
satisfaction. 
It is questionable if citizens are really interested in water board 
benchmarking among each other, and that the legitimacy of the water 
boards is proofed by their performances in number of licenses and quality 
controls. The self-financing system of regional taxes makes the water 
boards financially highly independent from national politics but also very 
vulnerable for criticism on spending. This can only be taken away by 
being visible and recognizable as a separate public authority on the one 
hand. And by obtaining local input and keeping up close ties with 
inhabitants on the other hand. 
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